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Abstract
We use a novel experimental design to examine the role of reputational concerns in explaining
conditional cooperation in social dilemmas. By using the strategy method in a repeated
sequential prisoners’ dilemma in which the probabilistic end is known, we can distinguish
between strategically and non-strategically motivated cooperation. Second movers who are
strong reciprocators ought to conditionally cooperate with ﬁrst movers irrespective of whether
the game continues or not. In contrast, strategically motivated second movers conditionally
cooperate only if the game continues and they otherwise defect. Experimental results, with
two diﬀerent subject pools, indicate reputation building is used around 30% of the time,
which accounts for between 50% and 75% of all realized cooperative actions. The percentage
of strong reciprocators varied between 6% to 23%.
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A large body of literature has demonstrated that even in one-shot settings a signiﬁcant number of
people are willing to cooperate, or at least conditionally cooperate, in social dilemmas (see e.g.,
Dawes and Thaler, 1988; Davis and Holt, 1993; Fischbacher et al., 2001). A number of authors
argue that this is due to individuals caring about fairness (Rabin, 1993) and has motivated
the development of various models of social preferences (for an overview see Fehr and Schmidt,
2006). It has also been conjectured that this is the result of evolutionary forces which have lead
humans to exhibit so-called strong reciprocity, that is, reciprocity irrespective of potential future
interaction (Gintis, 2000; Fehr et al., 2002). An important insight from these models is that,
even if small, a fraction of fair-minded individuals can have a considerable eﬀect on aggregate
outcomes (Fehr and G¨ achter, 2000). One such case is a situation with repeated interaction where
the presence of a few strong reciprocators gives incentives to rational own-payoﬀ maximizing
actors to build a reputation through strategic cooperation (Kreps et al., 1982).
In this paper, we run an experiment to examine the role of strategic and non-strategic con-
cerns in explaining cooperation. We implement a novel within-subjects design that allows us to
unambiguously distinguish to what extent individuals cooperate due to strong reciprocity and
to what extent due to reputation building.
Various experiments have shown that individuals display higher rates of cooperation in social
dilemma games where they repeatedly interact with the same subjects, so-called partners match-
ing, than in games where they repeatedly interact with diﬀerent individuals, strangers matching.1
Furthermore, a common observation in partners treatments is a sharp decline in cooperation at
the end of the game, particularly when it involves only two players (for a discussion of end-game
eﬀects see Selten and Stoecker, 1986). These patterns are consistent with both reputation build-
ing and strong reciprocity.2 That is, the decrease in cooperation observed when switching from
partners to strangers or when a game ends, can be due to two causes: ﬁrst, own-payoﬀ maximiz-
ing players who defect because they no longer have an incentive to cooperate, and second, strong
reciprocators who defect because they expect others to stop cooperating. Note that this problem
1This has been observed in, for example, public good games (Croson, 1996; Keser and van Winden, 2000),
bribery games (Abbink, 2004), principal-agent games (Cochard and Willinger, 2005), trust games (Huck et al.,
2006), and conﬂict games (Lacomba et al., 2008). For some exceptions see Andreoni and Croson (2003).
2Some authors argue that strangers matching has the additional disadvantage that some subjects might not
fully understand that interaction consists of a series on one-shot encounters (Levitt and List, 2007).
1cannot be easily resolved by eliciting beliefs3 as it is only on rare occasions in which reputation
builders and strong reciprocators are expected to exhibit diﬀerent belief-action combinations.
Our design allows us to circumvent this problem as we elicit the subjects’ strategies.
In our experiment, we can observe the extent to which cooperation is due to strategic consid-
erations, namely reputation building, or to non-strategic ones like strong reciprocity. Subjects
play a repeated prisoners’ dilemma game with a probability of continuation. We use the con-
tingent response or ‘strategy’ method developed by Selten (1967) to allow second movers to
condition their decision on: (i) whether the period they are playing is or is not the ﬁnal period
of the game, and (ii) whether the ﬁrst mover cooperates or defects. Eliciting the second movers’
strategy for the stage game conditioned on whether they is future interaction or not, is enough to
give us strong insights on the diﬀerent motivations behind cooperative behavior.4 To facilitate
reading, we will often refer to these conditional stage-game strategies simply as strategies.
In this game, second movers who cooperate when they know they are playing the last period
of the game must be motivated (at least in part) by non-strategic reasons. In contrast, second
movers who defect when they know it is the last period, but who cooperate when they know it is
not, are clearly motivated by strategic considerations.5 Since we are interested in situations where
cooperation by rational own-payoﬀ maximizers is due to reputation building, the probability of
continuation and the payoﬀs of the stage game are chosen such that trigger strategies such as
those proposed by Friedman (1971) and Axelrod (1981) do not support mutual cooperation as an
equilibrium. This reduces the motivations to cooperate to either strong reciprocity or reputation
building combined with the expectation that there exist some strong reciprocators.
Our design also has the advantage that it clearly isolates the end-game eﬀect. In games
with a ﬁnite number of periods, diﬀering abilities to perform backward induction (McKelvey and
Palfrey, 1992; Katok et al., 2002) can distribute the end-game eﬀect over the last few periods. In
our experiment, cooperation in non-ﬁnal and ﬁnal periods are clearly diﬀerentiated. Furthermore,
since we elicit end-game behavior over various periods, we can observe whether and how it evolves
over time.
3Croson (2000) and G¨ achter and Renner (2006), for example, measure beliefs in social dilemma experiments.
4Note that we do not elicit the second movers’ strategy for the whole game as this could require an inﬁnite
number of questions.
5The motivation behind the strategies of ﬁrst movers cannot be easily discerned since, as in other experiments,
they depend on their beliefs concerning the choice of second movers. For this reason we concentrate our analysis
on the second movers’ strategies.
2There are other experiments that concentrate as well on reputation building or eliciting types
of strategies. Early work in this area focused on testing the model of Kreps et al. (1982). These
papers report a close match to the model’s predictions (Camerer and Weigelt, 1988; Andreoni
and Miller, 1993; Sonnemans et al., 1999). However, they cannot easily diﬀerentiate between
types of strategies. A few papers have concentrated on eliciting strategies in one-shot settings
(Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher and G¨ achter, 2006), which permits them to identify strong
reciprocators but not individuals who use reputation building. The study which comes closest to
our paper is Muller et al. (2008), where subjects play a two-period linear public good game and
submit a strategy for the whole two periods. This allows them to see how individuals condition
their second period decision on the mean contribution of the ﬁrst period. They observe a sharp
decline of 45% in cooperation from one period to the next. However, they do not attempt to
identify speciﬁc types of strategies. Our design improves on theirs for the purpose of identifying
reputation building. As in their game groups consist of three players, there is a fairly continuous
contribution decision, information is limited to mean group contributions, and strategies are
conditioned only on mean contributions. This makes trigger strategies hard to implement and a
precise reputation building strategy hard to deﬁne.
On the basis of three treatments, with two diﬀerent subject pools, we ﬁnd evidence for
both reputation building and strong reciprocity with the former being the more common reason
why subjects cooperate. Reputation building constitutes around 30% of the second movers’
strategies and accounts for 55% of cooperative outcomes. Strong reciprocity corresponds to
between 6% and 23% of the second movers’ strategies and between 19% and 36% of cooperative
outcomes, depending on the proﬁtability of cooperation. Furthermore, with the use of two
control treatments we ﬁnd that applying the strategy method does not aﬀect the second movers’
behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our experimental design in more
detail. In Section 3 we present the results, and Section 4 concludes.
2 The Experiment
The game implemented in the experiment is a sequential prisoners’ dilemma with two players
that is repeated with a probability of continuation equal to δ. In the stage game, a ﬁrst mover
i = 1, and a second mover i = 2, choose between cooperating Ci, or defecting Di. If both players
cooperate they both get πC, if both defect they both get πD, and if one defects and the other
3cooperates the defector gets the temptation payoﬀ πT and the cooperator gets the sucker payoﬀ
πS. As in all prisoners’ dilemma games, payoﬀs are such that defecting is the dominant strategy:
πT > πC > πD > πS, and mutual cooperation is the eﬃcient outcome: 2πC > πT + πS.
By making their decision using the strategy method (Selten, 1967), players can condition
their choice on whether the game will continue or end. In each period t a number xt is drawn
from a uniform distribution with support [0,1]. If xt ≤ δ then t is not the ﬁnal period of the
game and the game continues. If xt > δ then the game ends as soon as period t is played. Both
ﬁrst movers and second movers submit an action depending on whether xt ≤ δ or xt > δ. In
addition, second movers submit an action also depending on whether the ﬁrst mover cooperates
or defects. Thus, whereas ﬁrst movers submit an action in two cases: (i) xt ≤ δ and (ii) xt > δ,
second movers submit an action in four cases: (i) C1 and xt ≤ δ, (ii) D1 and xt ≤ δ, (iii) C1
and xt > δ, and (iv) D1 and xt > δ. After both players submit their decisions, they learn the
realization of xt, the corresponding action of the other player, and their payoﬀ.6
As is well known, full cooperation in repeated games with an unknown end can be achieved
by rational individuals with the use of trigger strategies (Friedman, 1971). In fact, for a suf-
ﬁciently high δ, any proﬁle of play can be sustained as part of a subgame perfect equilibrium
(Rubinstein, 1979; Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986). However, mutual cooperation of rational own-
payoﬀ maximizers is no longer supported if the continuation probability falls below the threshold
δ∗ = (πT −πC)/(πT −πD).7 This follows from the fact that both players always defect if xt > δ,
and consequently, if xt ≤ δ the game is equivalent to one with an unknown end. In this case,
mutual cooperation can be sustained by a trigger strategy only if δ ≥ δ∗ in which case the second
mover gets a higher payoﬀ by cooperating than by defecting.8 Since we set δ < δ∗ in all our
treatments, we can conclude that observed strategies supporting mutual cooperation cannot be
due to rational own-payoﬀ maximizers who think all others are alike.9
6Note that players are only informed of the other player’s action for the actual realization of xt. Thus if xt ≤ δ,
the second mover learns whether the ﬁrst mover chose C1 or D1 when the game continues but does not learn the
ﬁrst mover’s choice if t had been the last period of the game.
7Note that we are assuming no time discounting in the experiment, which we think is reasonable since the time
interval between periods is very short and subjects are not paid until the end.
8A ﬁrst mover does not have an incentive to deviate from an equilibrium with mutual cooperation since, given
that a second mover would imitate defection, he can never attain the high temptation payoﬀ.




D) (see Stahl, 1991). However,
these equilibria require a high degree of coordination which is hard to achieve in the laboratory. We report whether
there is evidence for these type of strategies in footnote 12.
4However, if subjects believe they might play with a strong reciprocator, the fact that in
each period t they can condition their choice on whether t is the ﬁnal period or not opens the
possibility for cooperation through reputation building as in Kreps et al. (1982). This is driven
by two cases in which cooperation in the last period is possible. First, if the ﬁrst mover is a strong
reciprocator so that he cooperates in period t as long as the other player cooperated in t − 1,
then a rational second mover who maximizes own payoﬀ gets a higher payoﬀ by defecting in the
last period instead of in period t. This way, she gets the temptation payoﬀ and also enjoys the
high earnings of mutual cooperation during the game. Second, if a ﬁrst mover faces a suﬃciently
high probability that the second mover is a strong reciprocator, he is better oﬀ by cooperating
even in the last period. If this is the case, an own-payoﬀ maximizing second mover can mimic a
strong reciprocator up to the last period and then defect. This again gives her the temptation
payoﬀ and the beneﬁts of cooperation. Denoting α1 and α2 as the fraction of ﬁrst and second
movers who are strong reciprocators, the two conditions under which mutual cooperation can be
sustained in equilibrium are given below (calculations are provided in Appendix A)
(a) α1 ≥
πT − πC − δ(πT − πD)
πT − πD − δ(πT − πD)
or (b) α2 ≥
πD − πS
πC − πS .
As previously mentioned, our design allows us to observe the strategies used by second movers.
We call strong reciprocity the strategy that consists of conditionally cooperating with the ﬁrst
mover irrespective of whether they are playing the last period or not. Reputation building
corresponds to the strategy of conditionally cooperating only if they are not playing the last
period and defecting otherwise.10 These and other strategies of interest are described in Table 1.
For example, it is also informative to know the prevalence of second movers who choose the
strategy of unconditional defection. We should note, however, that we cannot diﬀerentiate
between second movers who are strategic but defect because they play a defection equilibrium
and second movers who defect for non-strategic reasons.
The experiment consists of two sets of treatments, each set run with a diﬀerent subject pool.
In all cases subjects where randomly paired and assigned to either the ﬁrst or the second mover
role. Roles and pairs were kept constant throughout the experiment giving us one independent
10A general worry with playing games with an unknown end is that subjects know the experiment cannot
last for an extremely long time. Thus, they might discount future interactions at a rate that is lower than δ.
However, for the purpose of our experiment, this can at most induce a very small decrease in the frequency of
strategically motivated cooperation (subjects who are not playing strategically and those who are already defecting
unconditionally are not aﬀected by more discounting). Thus, if we do observe reputation building, it is still clearly
strategic behavior in line with Kreps et al. (1982).
5Table 1: Strategies of second movers
Not the last period Last period
First mover First mover First mover First mover
Strategy Cooperates Defects Cooperates Defects
Reputation building Cooperate Defect Defect Defect
Strong reciprocity Cooperate Defect Cooperate Defect
Unconditional defection Defect Defect Defect Defect
Unconditional cooperation Cooperate Cooperate Cooperate Cooperate
observation per second mover. The commonly used experimental procedures for anonymity,
incentivized payments, and neutrally worded instructions were implemented. Next, we brieﬂy
describe each of the treatments. A detailed description of the experimental procedures, including
all treatment parameters and instructions are available in Appendix B.
The ﬁrst set of treatments was run in CentERlab at Tilburg University. It consists of one
treatment where we implement the game described above, which we refer to as Tilburg, and two
control treatments. In all cases, we chose a continuation probability of δ = 0.60 and the payoﬀs of
the stage game were selected so that δ∗ = 0.61. The value of xt was generated by the computer,
and in order keep the three treatments as comparable as possible, the random sequence of each
pair in the Tilburg treatment was used in one pair in each control treatment. The purpose of
this treatment is to identify the various strategies used by second movers, whereas the purpose
of the control treatments is to test the validity of the strategy method.
In principle, it is possible that the use of the strategy method induces a change in behavior. In
the experimental literature there is yet no consensus if this is indeed the case. Various authors
report no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in, for example, sequential dictator games (Cason and Mui,
1998), trust games (Vyrastekova and Onderstal, 2005), and, closest to our study, chicken and
prisoners’ dilemma games (Brandts and Charness, 2000). However, there are also studies that do
ﬁnd diﬀerences in behavior. For instance, some authors have found less punishment with the use
of the strategy method than without it (Brosig et al., 2003; Falk et al., 2005). For this reason,
we use two control treatments to ensure that the strategy method does not aﬀect behavior in
our setting. In the ﬁrst control treatment, Control I, subjects play the same game of Tilburg
except that they no longer submit a decision for both ﬁnal and non-ﬁnal periods. In other words,
subjects are ﬁrst told whether xt ≤ δ or xt > δ and then they make their decision. Note that
6second movers still submit separate choices depending on whether the ﬁrst mover cooperates or
not. By comparing choices, and, in particular, the stage-game strategy of second movers, between
this control and Tilburg we can test whether behavior is aﬀected by conditioning decisions on
whether it is the last period or not. In the second control, Control II, we again implement the
Tilburg game but this time without the use of the strategy method. In other words, subjects are
told whether xt ≤ δ or xt > δ before they decide and second movers learn what the ﬁrst mover
did before they make their choice. By comparing behavior between the two control treatments
we can test whether the decisions of second movers are aﬀected by the possibility to condition
their choice on whether the ﬁrst mover cooperated or defected.
In the second set of treatments, we implement the game with the full use of the strategy
method but this time we vary the value of δ∗ between treatments. We used a coin toss to
determine whether the game continues or ends, which makes the continuation probability equal
to δ = 0.50. These treatments are run for two reasons. The ﬁrst is that it is interesting to see
how the elicited strategies change as one varies the beneﬁt of cooperation. It is well established
that subjects are more willing to cooperate in non-strategic settings if it is more proﬁtable to
do so (e.g., Goeree et al., 2002). In our experiment, an increase in non-strategic cooperation,
if foreseen, ought to also increase the frequency of reputation building. The second reason is
that, although the evidence is mixed, there is some worry that the use of economics and business
students biases results in experiments involving cooperative behavior (e.g., Marwell and Ames,
1981; Engelmann and Strobel, 2006; Fehr et al., 2006). Since Tilburg’s subject pool consists
mainly of such students, we ran these two treatments in Northwestern University and excluded
students who study economics or a related ﬁeld. In the ﬁrst of these two treatments, Northwestern
High, we use a high payoﬀ for mutual cooperation such that δ∗ = 0.56. In the second treatment,
Northwestern Low, we use a low payoﬀ of mutual cooperation (keeping everything else constant)
such that δ∗ = 0.72.
In summary, we ran three treatments with which we can observe the prevalence of strategies
involving diﬀerent motivations for cooperation: Tilburg, Northwestern High, and Northwestern
Low. Furthermore, comparing the Northwestern treatments to each other allows us to see how
the use of strategies change with a change in the proﬁtability of cooperation, and lastly, using
Tilburg and the two control treatments we can identify any behavioral changes induced by the
strategy method. In the next section we present the results.
73 Results
In this section we present the experimental results. The main results are discussed in subsection
3.1, where we focus on the second movers’ cooperation rates and strategies. End-game eﬀects are
discussed in subsection 3.2. In subsection 3.3 we show—with the use of the control treatments—
that the strategy method does not aﬀect behavior in this game. Throughout this section, we test
diﬀerences in frequencies using likelihood-ratio χ2-tests. Since this is our most common test, in
order to avoid unnecessary repetition, we simply report the resulting p-values when it is used.
Moreover, since diﬀerent second movers played the game a diﬀerent number of periods, all tests,
ﬁgures, and tables based on aggregate data across periods are adjusted by the inverse number of
periods played. This way, each second mover, as one independent observation, receives an equal
weight.11
3.1 Disentangling conditional cooperation
In this section we give an overview of second movers’ cooperation rates and we disentangle their
motivations for conditionally cooperating. Overall, if we look at realized outcomes, the second
movers’ cooperation rate equals 0.251 in Tilburg, 0.395 in Northwestern High, and 0.147 in
Northwestern Low. We ﬁnd it to be signiﬁcantly higher in Northwestern High vis-` a-vis North-
western Low (p = 0.021), showing that the occurrence of mutual cooperation is sensitive to its
proﬁtability.
Conditional cooperation
Second movers conditionally cooperate: their cooperation rates are much higher when ﬁrst movers
cooperate than when ﬁrst movers defect. In Tilburg, if the ﬁrst mover cooperates, the second
movers’ cooperation rate is 0.366, and if he defects, it is 0.084. In Northwestern High, the
respective rates are 0.570 and 0.074, and in Northwestern Low 0.206 and 0.015. In all treatments
the diﬀerence in cooperation rates is statistically signiﬁcant (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, p <
0.004).
In what follows, we take a detailed look at the behavioral patterns by analyzing the actual
strategies chosen by second movers. This allows us to see the amount of conditional cooperation
that is due to reputation building and the amount that is due to other motivations. Figure 1
11We should note, however, that none of the reported signiﬁcant or not signiﬁcant results change if we use














Tilburg Northwestern High Northwestern Low
Reputation building Unconditional defection
Strong reciprocity Unconditional cooperation
Other
None
Figure 1: Frequency of strategies
Note: The pie charts show, for each treatment and across all periods, the frequency of
strategies used by second movers classiﬁed according to Table 1. Strategies are weighted by
the inverse number of periods played by each subject.
presents the distribution of second movers’ strategies in Tilburg and the two Northwestern treat-
ments using the classiﬁcation of Table 1. Overall, unconditional defection is the most common
strategy. It is chosen from 28% to 60% of the time. However, this still leaves considerable space
for strategies that are predicted only in the presence of individuals with social preferences.12
In all treatments, the most frequent strategy that includes some cooperation is reputation
building. It accounts for around 30% of all strategies. This is even the case in Northwestern Low
where the continuation probability is well below the threshold required for mutual cooperation.
The third most common strategy is strong reciprocity, whose frequency varies between 6% and
23%. Unconditional cooperation is used less than 5% of the time and other strategies in between
2% and 14%.13
12One can expect some degree of unilateral cooperation if subjects play a correlated equilibrium (Stahl, 1991).
If this is the case, some second movers must choose the strategy: D2 if C1 and xt ≤ δ, C2 if D1 and xt ≤ δ, and
D2 whenever xt > δ. We found only one second mover who chose this strategy once. Hence, we don’t ﬁnd support
for these type of equilibria, which can be due to the lack of a suitable coordination device.
13Two strategies account for around 70% of those in the category ‘other’. The ﬁrst is always defecting if it is
not the last period and conditionally cooperating if it is. The second is always cooperating if it is not the last
9Reputation building explains most of the second movers’ cooperation. If we look at the
fraction of their realized cooperative actions that are due to reputation building, we ﬁnd it to be
57% in Tilburg, 56% in Northwestern High, and 70% in Northwestern Low. In contrast, strong
reciprocity accounts for 14% of the second movers’ cooperation in Tilburg, 25% in Northwestern
High, and 20% in Northwestern Low.
Another way of observing the importance of reputation building is to look at the second
movers’ realized stage-game strategies (i.e. the strategies we would have observed if subjects
could not condition on whether it was the last period or not). We observe that conditional
cooperation is relatively common: it accounts for 31% of all stage-game strategies in Tilburg,
52% in Northwestern High, and 21% in Northwestern Low. Of the stage-game strategies that
imply conditional cooperation, in Tilburg 64% are due to subjects playing reputation building,
in Northwestern High it is 48%, and in Northwestern Low 64%. The respective percentages for
strong reciprocity are 12%, 44%, and 36%.
In Figure 1 one can also see a noticeable change in the frequency of strategies across the two
Northwestern treatments (the distributions are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, p = 0.043). This reveals
that the observed decrease in cooperation rates in Northwestern Low vis-` a-vis Northwestern
High is driven by a sharp increase in the frequency of unconditional defection at the expense of
strong reciprocity, unconditional cooperation, and strategies under ‘other’. Contrary to what we
expected, the frequency of reputation building is almost identical.
Stability of strategies
Next, we brieﬂy analyze the stability over time of the distribution of strategies. In all treatments,
the frequencies of strategies do not change considerably across periods. If we test, in each
treatment, for equality of distributions between the ﬁrst three periods we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences (p > 0.570). This tell us that the relative inﬂuence of reputation building and strong
reciprocity vary little with repetition. Next, we check whether this relative stability is hiding
substantial changes at the individual level.
In order to analyze the stability of strategies within each subject, we take a look at how often
subjects choose the same strategy. Speciﬁcally, we calculate the probability that a second mover
picks in period t the same strategy that she picked in period t − 1. Overall, second movers pick
the same strategy for consecutive periods 64% of the time in Tilburg, 72% in Northwestern High,
and 86% in Northwestern Low. The stability of individual strategies can be seen in Table 2 where
period and conditionally cooperating if it is.
10Table 2: Stability of strategies
Note: The table shows, for each strategy and treatment, the probability that a second mover
picks in period t the same strategy that she picked in period t−1. Probabilities are weighted
by the inverse of the number of periods played by each subject.
Reputation Strong Unconditional Unconditional
Other
building reciprocity defection cooperation
Tilburg 62% 100% 77% – 0%
Northwestern High 84% 88% 68% 80% 35%
Northwestern Low 88% 80% 88% – 0%
All treatments 77% 89% 78% 80% 21%
this probability is calculated separately for each strategy and treatment. From the table, one
can see that the three main strategies: reputation building, strong reciprocity, and unconditional
defection are quite stable. A second mover who chooses one of these strategies has around an 80%
chance of choosing the same strategy in the next period. In comparison, the strategies that fall
within ‘other’ are considerably less robust. In most cases, these strategies are chosen for only one
period at a time.14 With respect to the motivation of second movers to switch strategies, besides
choosing a strategy under ‘other’, we do not ﬁnd that either the previously chosen strategy or
the outcome in the stage game has a signiﬁcant eﬀect.15 In summary, strategies are fairly stable
both across periods and within subjects. A majority of subjects consistently chose one of the
strategies in Table 1, while other strategies are chosen less consistently.
14Using binomial probability tests and the null hypothesis that the probability of choosing the same strategy in
period t and t − 1 is less than 50% (i.e. a subject is more likely to switch than to choose the same strategy), we
can (weakly) reject it in all treatments for reputation building (p < 0.001), unconditional defection (p < 0.001),
and strong reciprocity (p < 0.056). For unconditional cooperation it is rejected in Northwestern High (p = 0.032).
Treating strategies under ‘other’ as a group, we cannot reject the null in any treatment (p > 0.998).
15We ran a probit regression with a binary variable indicating whether a subject changes strategy from period t
to t+1 as the dependent variable. We used the following independent variables: dummy variables for the strategy
chosen in t, dummy variables for the realized outcome in t, treatment indicator variables, and the period number.
We ﬁnd that choosing a strategy from ‘other’ in period t is associated with a 32% higher probability of choosing
a diﬀerent strategy in t+1 (p = 0.001, using White’s heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator to
cluster on each subject). However, we ﬁnd no other signiﬁcant eﬀect. We get the same result if we run a separate







1 2 3 4+ 1 2 3 4+ 1 2 3 4+
Tilburg Northwestern High Northwestern Low



















Figure 2: Mutual Cooperation Rates
Note: The ﬁgures show, for each treatment, the rate of mutual cooperation per period using
the subjects’ strategies to determine what their action would be if a given period is the last
period or not.
3.2 End-game eﬀects
If we look at mutual cooperation in ﬁnal periods and non-ﬁnal periods then a clear end-game
eﬀect is observed.16 The realized rate of mutual cooperation depending on whether it is the last
period or not is 0.363 and 0.033 in Tilburg, 0.590 and 0.000 in Northwestern High, and 0.333
and 0.000 in Northwestern Low. The sharp diﬀerence between the two indicates a strong eﬀect
of removing the strategic incentive to cooperate.
A clearer picture can be observed in Figure 2. In it, we show the rate of mutual cooperation
in each period t ∈ {1,2,3,4+}17 using the subjects’ strategies to determine what their action
would be if t is the ﬁnal period or not. As can be seen, mutual cooperation is higher when
subjects are not playing the last period of the game. This can be statistically conﬁrmed for
each treatment with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (p < 0.001). Notably, a signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between non-ﬁnal and ﬁnal periods is already present in the ﬁrst period (Wilcoxon signed-rank
tests, p < 0.001). This indicates there is already a clear diﬀerence in behavior between the two
16All results in this subsection also hold if we concentrate on the second movers’ cooperation rates.
17After period 3 the number of observations decreases considerably in some treatments.
12situations before subjects have the opportunity to interact (as in Keser and van Winden, 2000).
We should also note that we do not ﬁnd time trends in the rates of mutual cooperation for any
of the treatments, neither for non-ﬁnal periods nor for ﬁnal periods.18
Next, we look at the extent to which end-game eﬀects are due to ﬁrst movers switching
from cooperation to defection. A large fraction of the ﬁrst movers who cooperate do so only in
non-ﬁnal periods. In other words, their stage-game strategy consists of cooperating if it is not
the last period and defecting otherwise. In Tilburg, 73% of ﬁrst movers submit this strategy,
in Northwestern High it is 41% and in Northwestern Low 67%. This is interesting as in this
game, ﬁrst movers have an incentive to defect in the last period only if they anticipate that
a large fraction of second movers are cooperating strategically. Given that defection by ﬁrst
movers induces defection among strongly reciprocal second movers, the ﬁrst movers’ expectation
of reputation building is responsible for part of the observed drop in cooperation.
An insightful exercise is to isolate the eﬀect of the ﬁrst movers’ expectations in order to
compare the eﬀect of strategic and non-strategic second movers on cooperation in ﬁnal periods.
By using the subjects’ strategies, we can measure the increase in the rate of mutual cooperation
in last period if ﬁrst movers switch from their ﬁnal period to their action in non-ﬁnal periods.
In Tilburg and Northwestern Low, the rate of mutual cooperation increases only slightly. In the
former it changes from 0.033 to 0.067 and in the latter from 0.000 to 0.059. In Northwestern High
there is a considerable diﬀerence as it changes from 0.000 to 0.344. This reveals that the extent
to which end-eﬀects are driven by reputation building by second movers or by the ﬁrst movers’
expectation of reputation building depend on the proﬁtability of cooperation (and possibly the
subject pool). This can be important as, for example, manipulating ﬁrst movers’ expectations
would have an eﬀect on cooperation in ﬁnal periods when the proﬁtability of cooperation is high
but less so when it is low.
3.3 Control treatments
To ensure that the use of the strategy or contingent response method does not result in diﬀerent
behavior than the direct response method, we use this subsection to compare behavior in Tilburg
and the two control treatments.
18In all treatments, Spearman’s rank correlation coeﬃcients between cooperation rates and periods are not











Tilburg Control I Control II
Mutual defection 1st mover cooperates & 2nd mover defects
Mutual cooperation 1st mover defects & 2nd mover cooperates
None
Figure 3: Comparing outcomes with control treatments
Note: The pie charts show the frequency of each of the four possible outcomes in Tilburg
and the two control treatments. Outcomes are weighted by the inverse of the number of
periods played by each pair.
Figure 3 gives an overview of the distribution of realized outcomes in the three treatments.
It is clear that outcomes are highly similar. This is corroborated if we test for equality of
distributions across the three treatments (p = 0.992).19
Next, we compare Tilburg with Control I to determine whether the elicited stage-game strate-
gies change when they are conditioned on whether it is the last period or not. One could worry
that conditioning on the ﬁnal period might trigger more strategic thinking than otherwise, and
therefore, if the strategy method is used, there could be less conditional cooperation in the last
period. However, we do not ﬁnd this to be the case. As is shown in the top part of Table 3,
the frequencies of stage-game strategies for both treatments for non-ﬁnal and ﬁnal periods are
very similar (distributions are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent: p = 0.642 for non-ﬁnal periods and
p = 0.581 for ﬁnal periods). Furthermore, in Control I we do not see a higher frequency of
conditional cooperation in ﬁnal periods.20
19We do not get statistical signiﬁcance either if we do pairwise comparisons between treatments (p > 0.910), or
if we compare separately across treatments the frequency of each strategy (p > 0.745).
20There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences if we compare separately the frequency of each stage-game strategy across
14Table 3: Comparing strategies with control treatments
Note: The top half of the table shows, for Tilburg and the control treatments, the distribution
of the second movers’ stage-game strategies depending on whether it is the last period or
not. The bottom half shows the second movers’ cooperation rates depending on the ﬁrst
mover’s choice (actual cooperation rates for Control II and cooperation rates implied by the
stage-game strategies in the other two treatments). Strategies and rates are weighted by the
inverse of the number of periods played by each subject.
if not last period if last period
Tilburg Control I Control II Tilburg Control I Control II
Comparing stage-game strategies
Always cooperate 9% 2% 5% 10%
Cooperate if ﬁrst mover cooperates 39% 50% 16% 17%
Cooperate if ﬁrst mover defects 3% 5% 1% 7%
Always defect 49% 44% 78% 67%
Comparing cooperation rates
When the ﬁrst mover cooperates 48% 52% 54% 21% 27% 13%
When the ﬁrst mover defects 12% 7% 8% 6% 17% 14%
Lastly, we compare cooperation rates between Control II and the other two treatments to test
whether second movers’ choices are aﬀected by conditioning them on the ﬁrst movers’ action.
The actual cooperation rates in Control II and the ones implied by the strategies in the other
treatments are seen in the bottom part of Table 3. We do not ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between the frequencies of the three treatments when running tests that compare
separately non-ﬁnal periods and ﬁnal periods depending on whether the ﬁrst mover cooperates
or defects (p > 0.428). This also holds if we do pairwise tests between treatments (p = 0.202).
Thus, we tentatively conclude that the strategy method is a valid technique for the elicitation of
strategies in this game.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we provide evidence for the importance of reputation building for cooperation
in social dilemmas. We report the results of a laboratory experiment where subjects play a
repeated sequential prisoners’ dilemma with a probabilistic end. Choices can be conditioned on
treatments (p > 0.268).
15whether the period of play is the ﬁnal period or not. This design allows us to separate strategic
from non-strategic cooperation. Since in our design mutual cooperation is not an equilibrium
when all individuals are rational own-payoﬀ maximizers, strategic cooperation is consistent with
reputation building and the belief that some players cooperate for non-strategic reasons.
We ﬁnd that subjects use the reputation building strategy around 30% of the time, which
accounts for between 50% and 75% of all realized cooperative actions. We also ﬁnd that the
frequency of reputation building is largely unaﬀected by changes in the subject pool or by
repetition. The other two commonly-used strategies are unconditional defection (used between
28% and 60% of the time) and strong reciprocity (between 6% and 23%). The latter accounts
for between 19% and 36% of cooperative actions. We ﬁnd the distribution of strategies to be
fairly stable in time and within subjects.
The observed end-game eﬀects are partly due to second movers playing strategically and
partly due to the belief by ﬁrst movers that second movers are playing strategically. Abstracting
from ﬁrst movers’ beliefs, we ﬁnd that end-game eﬀects are robust to ﬁrst-mover actions in
Tilburg and Northwestern Low due to the relatively large fraction of cooperation that is due
to reputation building by second movers. In Northwestern High, the end-game eﬀect would be
considerably smaller if ﬁrst movers were to cooperate more often in the ﬁnal period.
Lastly, we see a decline in the cooperation rate as the payoﬀ from mutual cooperation de-
creases. The diﬀerence is driven by a decrease in the number of subjects cooperating non-
strategically. This is consistent with subjects receiving utility from money and from complying
with a ‘fairness norm’, as in the various models of social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006).
However, it would be interesting to know precisely who changes strategies. Do subjects who
play as strong reciprocators switch straight to defection or do they switch to reputation build-
ing? Knowing this would give us a better understanding of the various motivations behind the
subjects’ actions. In this sense, running an experiment where the proﬁtability of cooperation is
varied within subjects would be an interesting line of future research.
We should note, however, that if one assumes rational expectations some of our results are
not consistent with reputation building as modeled in Kreps et al. (1982). Although the fraction
of subjects playing the strong reciprocity strategy (or other strategies that produce cooperation
in the ﬁnal period) is large enough in Tilburg and Northwestern High to support reputation
building, it is too small in Northwestern Low. According to the theoretical model, for reputation
building to be proﬁtable the percentage of strong reciprocators in the population ought to be at
least 31%, which is well above the one observed. In this case, if subjects in inﬁnitely repeated
16games move toward the supported equilibria when the super-game is repeated many times (as in
Dal Bo and Fr´ echette, 2007), ﬁrst movers with enough experience might also stop cooperating
in our game. However, another possibility is that individuals might build a reputation due to
evolved aﬀective responses (Fessler and Haley, 2003), and thus, in some cases, reputation building
might still occur even when it is not proﬁt-maximizing.
A Equilibrium Calculations
For the reported equilibria, we rely on strong reciprocators applying a grim trigger strategy.
That is, a deviation from the mutual cooperation equilibrium implies defection until the game
ends (as in Kreps et al., 1982). Since this is the harshest punishment for deviating, it gives the
most favorable conditions for mutual cooperation to arise. We consider two types of players,
rational own-payoﬀ maximizers and strong reciprocators.
Note that, irrespective of their type, ﬁrst movers will never deviate from a mutual cooperation
equilibrium as such an action would be followed with defection by the second mover, which implies
ﬁrst movers cannot get the higher temptation payoﬀ. Equilibria are thus driven by the second
movers’ incentive to deviate.
Reputation building equilibria require the possibility that there is cooperation by ﬁrst movers
in the last period. This can happen for two reasons: (i) the fraction of strong reciprocators
among second movers is high enough that rational own-payoﬀ maximizing ﬁrst movers are better
oﬀ cooperating in the last period, or (ii) the fraction of strong reciprocators among ﬁrst movers
is high enough that a second mover has a very high chance that if the last period is reached
without a deviation, the ﬁrst mover cooperates.
Rational own-payoﬀ maximizing ﬁrst movers cooperate in the last period if no deviation has
occurred and the probability that the second mover is a strong reciprocator is high enough. That
is, α2πC + (1 − α2)πS ≥ πD, which, solving for α2 gives the condition
α2 ≥
πD − πS
πC − πS . (1)
In this case, all ﬁrst movers cooperate in the last period irrespective of their type, and rational















17which is true if πC > πD. Thus, if (1) holds, mutual cooperation is an equilibrium until the last
period of the game.
Even if rational own-payoﬀ maximizing ﬁrst movers defect in the last period, for instance
because (1) does not hold, mutual cooperation in non-ﬁnal periods is still possible if the fraction
of strong reciprocators among ﬁrst movers is high enough. Given that α1 is the fraction of strong
reciprocators among ﬁrst movers who do not defect in the last period if no previous defection
has occurred, and that 1−α1 is the fraction of rational own-payoﬀ maximizing ﬁrst movers who
do defect in the last period, rational own-payoﬀ maximizing second movers prefer to cooperate
instead of defecting in period t = 0 if:
α1πT + (1 − α1)πD +
∞ X
t=1




α1πT + (1 − α1)πD +
δ
1 − δ




which, solving for α1, gives the condition
α1 ≥
πT − πC − δ(πT − πD)




The 45-minute experiment was programmed and conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Subjects were recruited through online recruitment systems. In total, 312 subjects participated
in the experiment. Each subject played in only one treatment.
The details of the ﬁve treatments are summarized in Table B1. As can be seen, the Tilburg
treatment and the two controls were run with students of economics and business administration
in the CentERlab in Tilburg University. The Northwestern High and Low treatments were
run with students from neither economics nor business in the laboratory of the Kellogg School
of Management in Northwestern University.21 Average earnings in Tilburg treatments were
e9.38 and $11.20 in Northwestern treatments (10 points equaled e1.50 in Tilburg and $2.00 in
Northwestern, amounts exclude a showup fee of $6 in Northwestern).
21In Northwestern, the areas of study were: journalism/communication (21%), engineering (21%), bi-
ology/chemistry/physics (16%), anthropology/political science/sociology (15%), history/languages/philosophy,
(12%), arts (8%), and others (8%).
18Table B1: Experimental treatments
Northwestern Northwestern
Tilburg Control I Control II
High Low
Parameters
Mutual defection πD 15 15 15 15 15
Unilateral defection πT 33 33 33 33 33
Unilateral cooperation πS 6 6 10 10 10
Mutual cooperation πC 23 20 22 22 22
Probability of continuation δ 0.50 0.50 0.60 0.60 0.60
Threshold for cooperation δ∗ 0.56 0.72 0.61 0.61 0.61
Threshold for cooperation α1 0.11 0.44 0.03 0.03 0.03
Threshold for cooperation α2 0.53 0.64 0.42 0.42 0.42
Characteristics
Location Northwestern Northwestern Tilburg Tilburg Tilburg
Field of study Not economics Not economics Economics Economics Economics
Number of second movers 32 34 30 30 30
After their arrival, subjects drew a card to be randomly assigned to a seat in the laboratory,
and consequently to a role and a treatment. Once everyone was seated, subjects were given the
instructions for the experiment. The instructions are written with neutral language and clearly
explain the decision of ﬁrst and second movers, including an explanation of the strategy method
(see below). Thereafter, roles were revealed and subjects had to answer a few control questions to
corroborate their understanding of the game. Next, they played the game until the random draw
indicated that it ended. Once the game ﬁnished, subjects answered a debrieﬁng questionnaire
after which they were paid in cash and dismissed.
Experimental procedures were identical in both locations with one exception. Namely, the
method used to randomly determine whether the experiment continued or not. In Tilburg we
used the computer to determine for each group and in each period whether the game continued
or not. Then, in order to facilitate treatment comparisons, we used the same sequence of random
numbers in the control treatments. For the Northwestern treatments, we used a simpler random
number generator: a coin toss. In this case, a toss of the coin determined whether the game
19continued or ended for all groups in a given session. The average number of periods played in
Tilburg equaled 2.73, in Northwestern Low and High it was 2.32 and 4.06, respectively.
B.2 Experimental Instructions
These are the instructions for second movers in the Northwestern High treatment. The instruc-
tions for ﬁrst movers and those of other treatments are very similar and available from the
authors upon request.
General
You are participating in an experiment on economic decision making and will be asked to make
a number of decisions. If you follow the instructions carefully, you can earn money. At the end
of the experiment, you will be paid your earnings in private and in cash.
You are not allowed to communicate with other participants. If you have a question, raise
your hand and one of us will help you.
During the experiment your earnings will be expressed in points. Points will be converted to
US dollars at the following rate: 10 points = $2.00.
The experiment is strictly anonymous: that is, your identity will not be revealed to others
and the identity of others will not be revealed to you.
In the experiment, participants will be randomly divided into groups of 2 participants. You
will therefore be in a group with one other participant. The composition of the groups will
remain the same during the entire experiment.
In each group, one participant will be randomly assigned to the ﬁrst mover position. The
other participant in the group will be in the second mover position. Your position as ﬁrst or
second mover will remain the same during the entire experiment.
Your decision in each period
The experiment is divided into periods. In each period, both the ﬁrst and the second mover make
a choice between option A and option B. The ﬁrst mover makes his/her decision ﬁrst. Thereafter
the second mover makes his/her decision. The following table shows what the ﬁrst and second
movers earn (in points) depending on their choices:
Number of Periods
For each group, the number of periods of in the experiment is determined randomly. At the
end of each period, we will throw a coin to determine whether that period was the last period
of the experiment or whether the experiment continues (heads means the experiment continues





both choose A 23 23
ﬁrst mover chooses A and
the second mover chooses B
6 33
ﬁrst mover chooses B and
the second mover chooses A
33 6
both choose B 15 15
continues is 50% and the probability that the experiment ends is 50%. Your total earnings in
the experiment will equal the sum of earnings across all periods.
After each period, you will receive feedback concerning the decision of the other participant
in your group and on your earnings.
The decision of the ﬁrst mover
In each period, the ﬁrst mover makes his/her decision in each of the two following situations:
• Do you choose A or B if the current period is not the ﬁnal period (in other words the
experiment proceeds to a next period)?
• Do you choose A or B if the current period is the ﬁnal period (in other words the experiment
does not proceed)?
If the result of the coin toss is that the experiment continues (heads), then earnings in that
period will depend on the answer to the ﬁrst question. If the result of the coin toss is that the
experiment ends (tails), then earnings depend on the answer to the second question.
The decision of the second mover
In each period, the second mover makes his/her decision in each of the four following situations:
• If the ﬁrst mover chooses A: Do you choose A or B if the current period is not the ﬁnal
period (in other words the experiment proceeds to a next period)?
• If the ﬁrst mover chooses A: Do you choose A or B if the current period is the ﬁnal period
(in other words the experiment does not proceed)?
• If the ﬁrst mover chooses B: Do you choose A or B if the current period is not the ﬁnal
period (in other words the experiment proceeds to a next period)?
21• If the ﬁrst mover chooses B: Do you choose A or B if the current period is the ﬁnal period
(in other words the experiment does not proceed)?
If the result of the coin toss is that the experiment continues (heads) and the ﬁrst mover
chooses A, earnings will depend on the answer to the ﬁrst question. If the result of the coin toss
is that the experiment ends (tails) and the ﬁrst mover chooses A, earnings will depend on the
answer to the second question. If the result of the coin toss is that the experiment continues
(heads) and the ﬁrst mover chooses B, earnings will depend on the answer to the third question.
If the result of the coin toss is that the experiment ends (tails) and the ﬁrst mover chooses B,
earnings will depend on the answer to the fourth question.
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